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We explore the role of reciprocity in wage determination by combining experimental 
and survey data.  The experiment is similar to Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe￿s (1995) 
and is conducted with Ghanaian manufacturing workers. The survey relates to the 
same sample workers and the firms within which they are employed. We find a strong 
positive association between individual reciprocity and individual wages. However, 
the direction of causality is unclear. Various aspects of the distribution of the 
tendency to reciprocate within an employee￿s workforce are also associated with that 
employee￿s wage and, in this case, there are strong arguments for a causal link is from 
former to latter. In particular, the mean, median, and minimum levels of reciprocity 
have a positive effect on wages, while the spread in the distribution (standard 
deviation) has a strong significant negative effect.  This suggests that homogenous 
behaviour, or convergence to a norm, is rewarded. The results underline the 






Key words:  wages, reciprocity, field experiment 
JEL classification: J31, C93 ,Z13 
                                                 
1 All comments are welcome; please send them to: pieter.serneels@econ.ox.ac.uk.  
2 We would like to thank the participants of seminars at the Universities of Copenhagen and Oxford for 
useful comments.   2
1. Introduction 
 
Do workers￿ social preferences ￿ their behavioural tendencies in interactive situations 
￿ affect their productivity and earnings? There are two possible channels through 
which such an effect might act. First, individual workers who are more cooperative, 
reciprocating, accepting of authority, team spirited, and so on may be more productive 
than their less ￿other regarding￿ colleagues and may be remunerated accordingly. 
Second, workers may interact to create workplace cultures that are more or less 
supportive of collectively productive behaviour. Behavioural norms may emerge that 
encourage greater cooperation and the application of greater effort. Social sanctioning 
mechanisms that serve to enforce these norms may also emerge and be effective due 
to workers￿ preferences for acceptance and acknowledgement by their colleagues 
Bernheim (1994), Akerlof (1980). 
 
In contrast to labour economics as a whole, the existing evidence pertaining to these 
behavioural questions is predominantly experimental, coming from laboratory-based 
experiments using university students as subjects. An experimental approach to these 
questions has major advantages over a survey-based approach. In particular, because 
there is full control over the decision making environment, the approach allows 
researchers to isolate the effects of specific behavioural tendencies on specific 
outcomes. Thus, building on the work of Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993), 
Charness (1996) shows that ￿workers￿ deliver greater effort when wages are set higher 
because they wish both to share fairly and reciprocate acts of generosity. And Ostrom 
et al (1992) and Fehr and Gachter (2000) show that agents in groups such as work 
teams will, if given the opportunity, punish socially inefficient behaviour by fellow   3
group members and can elicit greater cooperation as a result. However, such 
experimental evidence is often criticised as lacking in external validity. Is it 
appropriate to assume that undergraduate students in university laboratories behave 
similarly to workers in enterprises or that choosing to contribute money to a shared 
fund is equivalent to contributing effort to a collective assignment? And is a social 
norm that emerges within the context of a laboratory experiment in any way 
equivalent to a social norm that emerges, probably over a much longer period of time, 
in a workplace? The answer to each of these questions is that we simply do not know 
for, as yet, we have very little evidence pertaining to the external validity of 
laboratory-run experiments.  
 
Some survey-based evidence relating to the impact of behavioural characteristics on 
labour market outcomes does exist. The Bureau of the Census (1998), for example, 
showed that, when recruiting new production staff, US employers ranked attitude and 
communication skills above years of schooling and grades. Green, Machin and 
Wilkenson (1998) reported that UK employers suffering recruitment problems cite 
deficits in attitude and motivation as the primary reason. With respect to wage 
adjustments for existing employees, Kaufman (1984), Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler (2000) ,Blinder and Don Choi (1990), Levine (1993), Agell and Lundborg 
(1995), and, most recently, Bewley (1999) found that employers resist cutting wages 
because of the impact it has on worker morale, especially it seems when the cut is 
viewed as unfair or as an act of hostility. And with respect to the possible role of 
behavioural norms and social sanctions, Hamilton et al (2003) showed that a shift 
from individual piece rates to group piece rates can dramatically increase productivity 
and Bartel et al (2003) found that employee attitudes in the US banking sector both   4
differ between workplaces and affect workplace productivity. However, while 
externally valid and potentially salient to our question, such studies fail to identify the 
precise nature of the behavioural characteristics involved in generating the observed 
outcomes. Also, they depend critically on subjective assessments by respondents 
about their own and others￿ behavioural tendencies and motivations and these can be 
biased depending on how the incentives associated with different responses are 
perceived within the context of the survey (Fehr, Fischbacher, Rosenbladt, Schupp 
and Wagner (2003)). 
 
Here, following the recommendation of Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2001), we use a 
combined empirical approach to obviate the problems raised above while 
investigating the effects of one particular behavioural characteristic on earnings. We 
use an economic experiment to derive measures of workers￿ individual and collective 
tendencies to reciprocate which we then analyse in conjunction with survey data on 
the earnings and socioeconomic characteristics of the same workers and data on the 
characteristics such as the size of the workforce, profits, and ownership structure 
collected from the workers￿ employers. Thus, we find that individual reciprocity and 
earnings are highly correlated, although we cannot determine the direction of 
causality. We also find that the distribution of reciprocity across employees within the 
workplace affects earnings and by inference productivity. This lends support to the 
hypothesis that workplace culture affects labour market outcomes. 
 
The paper has 5 sections. In section 2 we provide a brief review of the theoretical 
literature on reciprocity and earnings and the experimental evidence relating to the 
role of reciprocity and workplace culture in determining effort. In section 3 we outline   5
our combined methodology. In section 4 we present our results relating to the effect 
of individual reciprocity (section 4.1) and the effect of the distribution of 
reciprocating tendencies within the workplace (section 4.2) on earnings. Finally, in 
section 5 we present our conclusions about the relationship between reciprocity and 
earnings and critically review our combined empirical approach to behavioural issues 
in labour economics.  
 
2. Experimental evidence on reciprocity, social norms, effort, and earnings 
 
The tendency to reciprocate has received considerable theoretical attention as a strong 
motivator in both interactive contexts in general (Rabin (1998), Fehr and Falk (2002)) 
and labour market interactions in particular. Over two decades ago Akerlof (1982) 
modeled a labour transaction as a gift exchange game between employer and 
employee. This inspired a series of empirical studies that took the form of laboratory-
based behavioural experiments involving undergraduate students. Thus, Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) found that ￿workers￿ deliver greater effort when wages 
are set higher. Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiger (1997) presented results suggesting that 
reciprocity is a contract enforcement device, while Fehr and Gachter￿s (1998) results 
emphasized the more general function of reciprocity as a powerful effort elicitation 
device. And, as described above, Charness (1996) showed that higher paid 
reciprocating workers are in part sharing their additional wealth with their employer 
and in part responding to their employer￿s generosity.  
 
But should our focus be reciprocity between employers and employees? Particularly 
in large enterprises, employer-employee dyads represent only a small proportion of all   6
the dyads in the enterprise. Further, some researchers have argued that the notion of 
reciprocity is essentially interpersonal (Offer 1997, Polanyi 1957), implying that, 
since in large hierarchical organizations the employer is perceived as an abstract and 
anonymous concept rather than a real person, the notion of reciprocity cannot be 
ascribed to the interactions between employer and employee. Yet only the experiment 
of Schotter (1998) explores the impact of reciprocity between employees. Schotter￿s 
experiment had two stages. In the first, the subjects developed beliefs about each 
others￿ reciprocating tendencies during a game of trust and in the second they 
participated in a coordination game. Schotter found that the performance of the 
players in the coordination game was influenced by the beliefs they developed during 
the preceding trust game and took this as evidence that reciprocity and trust facilitate 
efficient exchange of information and ease coordination. 
 
The experimental literature on public goods games, behavioural norms and social 
sanctioning is also of relevance here as it relates to the role of workplace culture in 
determining effort. Building on the work of Ostrom et al (1992) and Fehr and Gachter 
(2000) cited above, Carpenter (2000) found that familiarity improves the efficacy of 
punishment suggesting that some stability in the group within which a norm may 
emerge may be important. Sefton et al (2000) and Dickinson (2001) found that both 
reward and punishment can improve efficiency thereby providing some insights into 
how social norms might optimally be maintained. And Huck et al (2003) found that 
individual extrinsic incentives can crowd out efficiency enhancing social norms. 
 
3. Methodology 
   7
We seek answers to two questions. Are more reciprocating workers paid more? And 
are workplaces with stronger social norms of reciprocity more productive and so 
higher paying? To address these questions we combine experimentally derived data 
on individual workers￿ tendencies to reciprocate and the strength of the social norm to 
reciprocate within their places of work with survey data on earnings, workers￿ socio-
economic characteristics, and employers￿ characteristics. Survey-based data on 
earnings and socio-economic characteristics have often been used to explain 
variations in experimentally derived behavioural measures. Thus, for example, 
Glaeser et al (2000) show that students with higher social status can elicit greater trust 
from their playing partners in face-to-face trust games. However, the use of 
experimental data to predict actual economic outcomes is rare. Binswanger (198?) 
was one of the first to try: he used experimentally derived measures of risk aversion to 
predict investment decisions made by smallholder farmers in India. Subsequently, 
Barr and Packard (2002) used similar measures to predict involvement in formal 
pension schemes in Peru, while Karlan (2003) used experimentally derived measures 
of trust and trustworthiness to predict loan repayment in microfinance schemes also in 
Peru. 
 
One reason for the rarity of combining experimental and survey data is that the 
approach generally requires field-based behavioural experimentation, i.e., the 
experiments have to involve subjects drawn from the population of interest and, 
depending on the question to be addressed, may have to be conducted in the context 
of interest. Taking experiments to the field challenges our ability to control the 
decision making environment and brings us into contact with subjects who are less 
familiar with abstract decision-making than undergraduate students. Control and   8
subject cognition affect the quality of our data. As each declines the data becomes 
increasingly noisy, thereby reducing our ability to identify the relationships of 
interest. That Binswanger, Barr and Packard, and Karlan have identified such 
relationships indicates that control and cognition can be sufficient to support the type 
of analysis we propose. However, it is worth bearing in mind that the statistical 
significance of experimentally derived measures placed on the right hand side of 
regression analyses may be suppressed by these factors. As the following account 
attests, we took great care to ensure a high degree of control and subject cognition in 
our experiment.  
 
Our experiment involved the Investment Game designed by Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe (1995). The game has two players. At the start of the game both players 
receive an equal amount of cash, x. Player one has to decide how much of her cash, s 
<  x, to pass to the second player. The amount she passes is tripled by the 
experimenter, and then given to the second player. The second player then decides 
how much to pass back, r < 3s, to the first player. So, the first player￿s final payoff is 
x-s+r  and the second player￿s final payoff is x+3s-r. Under the classical assumptions 
of selfish money maximization the second player returns nothing and, knowing this, 
the first player sends nothing.  
 
We involved 424 full employees and apprentices from 22 Ghanaian manufacturing 
enterprises in the experiments. However, the experimental data used in the analysis 
below pertains only to the 113 full employees who took the role of second player and 
received some positive amount from their corresponding first player. These full 
employees were drawn from 20 different enterprises. In order that we might generate   9
estimates relating to the distribution of reciprocating behaviour for every workforce, 
we drew random samples from each enterprise. The total number of sampled 
employees from each enterprise varied from 8 to 46, with sampling proportions 
varying from 9 to 53 percent. 
 
The games were played after work hours, in the evenings or on Saturday afternoons, 
in schools near to the employees￿ places of work. Two classrooms and a corridor were 
used in every case. The employees were taught the game while sitting at amply 
spaced desks in one of the classrooms. Then they were called one at a time to 
interviews with a research assistant sitting at a desk in the corridor. In these 
interviews they were taught the game once more, were verbally tested on their 
understanding of the game, and then played. Then they were directed to wait in the 
second classroom until everyone had played and they could receive their payoffs. 
Both the description of the game presented in the first classroom and the one-to-one 
interviews were scripted. The scripts were written in English, translated into Twi, a 
Ghanaian language spoken by all of the employees in our sample, piloted and 
adjusted, and then back translated by an uninformed translator to check that intended 
meanings had not changed (Appendix 1 contains a copy of the script in English). The 
scripts were adhered to at all times. If subjects asked questions, the relevant part of 
the script was repeated. The experimenter (Barr) and a monitor were posted in the 
first classroom to prevent the waiting employees talking after learning the game but 
prior to making their decisions. Both roles and pairs were randomly assigned. The 
first players (the trusters) were interviewed in random order and then the second 
players (the trustees) were interviewed, again in random order. Each player knew that 
they were playing with a colleague but did not know which particular colleague.   10
 
Our measure of individual employees￿ tendencies to reciprocate is the natural log of 
the amount returned by them when assuming the role of second player, expressed as a 
proportion of the amount sent by the first player, ln(r/s). 
 
We ensured that the employees both played and knew they were playing with 
colleagues from the same workforce in the hope that they would bring not only their 
own personal preferences and internalized motivations but also entire sets of 
heuristics, socially acquired values and expectations about how others might play into 
the experimental context (Cardenas (2003) and Harrison and List (2003)). Thus, our 
behavioural measures may capture workplace social norms (Henrich et al (2001)).  
 
If generally adhered to, social norms that define what an individual should do when 
interacting with others, can reduce the uncertainty that individuals face when 
interacting with one another and so reduce the costs of interaction. Thus, they can 
facilitate effective communication, coordination, and cooperation. In the context of an 
enterprise this can have positive effects on productivity and, hence, on earnings. 
Ceteris paribus, in contexts where there is divergence between privately and socially 
optimal behaviour, a social norm stating that individuals should behave in accordance 
with the social optimum or in a way that will cause others to behave in accordance 
with the social optimum would lead to greatest efficiency. However, adherence to 
such norms may not be as great as adherence to norms that advocate behaviour that 
diverges less from the private optimum. Low adherence implies less predictable 
behaviour and so less efficiency.  
   11
Thus, the strength of a reciprocating norm can be thought of as having two 
dimensions the first relating to the expected return on trust that the norm implies, and 
second relating to the extent to which the norm is adhered, i.e., the extent to which it 
suppresses variation in that return.
3 Our proxy for the first of these dimensions is the 
mean level of reciprocity displayed by the employees from each workplace during the 
game,  ) / ln( s r .
4 We use two proxies for the second dimension, the standard deviation 
of reciprocity across the workers from each workplace, sd )) / (ln( s r  and the minimum 
level of reciprocity within each workplace, min )) / (ln( s r . The latter will be of 
particular importance if agents fear or are averse to being the victim of a betrayal and 
are, as a result, highly focused on the worst possible response they could get to an act 
of trust. 
 
We predict employees￿ earnings (w) using an econometric model based on human 
capital theory (Becker 1993, Mincer 1974): wages are modeled as a function of 
individual employee characteristics (I) and employer or workplace characteristics (F): 
( ) ,, wf I F ε =  
The vector I  usually includes the age, sex, education, experience, and the family 
background of the employee. However, we extend the definition of human capital to 
include the individual employee￿s tendency to reciprocate. Similarly, in addition to 
the usual employer characteristics, such as the size of the workforce, ownership 
structure, and profits, we include in F our proxies for the strength of reciprocating 
norms. A positive, significant, and robust coefficient on  ) / ln( s r  will be taken as 
                                                 
3 Barr (2003) shows that, across a sample of 26 Zimbabwean villages, levels of trust increase with 
mean reciprocity and decrease with the variation in reciprocity. 
4 The mode would have been a more natural choice. However, across workplaces the mode varies little 
and, so, performs badly in the regressions. We also tried the median, but this performs less well than 
the mean.   12
evidence that more reciprocating workers are more productive and remunerated 
accordingly. A positive, significant and robust coefficient on  ) / ln( s r , a negative, 
significant and robust coefficient on sd )) / (ln( s r , and a positive, significant and 
robust coefficient on min )) / (ln( s r  will be taken as evidence that workplaces with 




Figure 1 contains a histogram and a kernel density estimation for the reciprocity of 
workers. We find that reciprocity follows a bimodal distribution, with one peak 
corresponding to a reciprocity score of 1 (ln(r/s)=0)) and another corresponding to a 
reciprocity score of 2 (ln(r/s)=0.69). Most of the workers who deviate from these 
modes fall in between the two, suggesting that there are essentially three groups: those 
who send back exactly what the first player gave away keeping all of the return on the 
trusting act for themselves; those who send back twice the amount sent by the first 
player, thereby ensuring equal final payoffs to both players and providing a 100 
percent rate of return to the trustor; and those who choose some positive rate of return 
less than 100 percent for the trustor. Many in the third group chose a rate of return of 
50 percent for the trustor. It is unclear why there are three types: it may be due to 
variations in exogenous individual characteristics such as preferences, to the existence 
of distinct workplace cultures, or, if the way the employees play the game is subject to 
some sort of income effect, to variations in the employees￿ earnings. 
   13
Figure 2 plots the histogram and kernel density function for earnings. The distribution 
is unimodal and skewed slightly to the right.
5 This suggests that even if reciprocity 
and wages are related (as we show below) variations in reciprocity ￿ as measured 
within the context of the game ￿ cannot result solely from an income effect. 
  
4.1 Individual reciprocity as a predictor of earnings 
 
To see whether reciprocity predicts earnings, we regress the log of earnings on 
) / ln( s r  while controlling for other individual characteristics. The other individual 
characteristics we include are: years with current employer, years of formal education, 
sex, age, age squared, whether the individual is related to their employer by blood, 
and whether the individual is a member of a labour union (Table 2 contains precise 
definitions and means). Table 3 presents the results. The first column reports an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and indicates that reciprocity and wages are 
positively related (10 percent significance level). The coefficient reflects the elasticity 
of wages with respect to reciprocity and is very large: a one percent change in 
reciprocity is associated with a 15 percent change wage. 
 
However, this result may suffer from endogeneity bias. Most theorists working in this 
area assume that an individual￿s propensity to reciprocate is exogenous. So, for 
example, Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2001) abstract to two types of agents, one more 
and one less reciprocating. But this does not imply that our measure is exogenous. 
The experiments were conducted using money which may have framed the game in 
the minds of the employees. This could have had several effects on their decisions 
                                                 
5 A Shapiro-Wilk test as well as a combined test for skewness and kurtosis rejects the hypothesis that 
wages are normally distributed for either workers or apprentices.     14
including an income effect ￿ those who earn more may have been more inclined to 
reciprocate ￿ thereby bringing our first regression result into question. So, in Column 
2  of  
   15
Table 3 we report the results for a two stage instrumental variable estimation in which 
we instrument for reciprocity. The coefficient on individual reciprocity is no longer 
significant even though the point estimate is unchanged. The first stage regression is 
reported in column 3 (Table 2 contains precise definitions and means of all the right 
hand side variables in the first stage regression). We find that ￿unhappiness as a 
child￿, ￿being a youngest child￿, and ￿being a member of an association￿ all have a 
significant and positive effect on reciprocity. Being born outside Ghana, a member of 
a union, working in Kumasi, and belonging to a new, as opposed to an old or world, 
Christian religion all have significant negative effects. This first stage equation 
explains 24 percent of the variation in reciprocity across our sample. This is 
encouraging when viewed in isolation but may not be sufficient to support the second 
stage of the estimation procedure. This alone may explain why the coefficient on 
reciprocity in the second stage regression is not significant.
6 
 
As a further check on the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the reciprocity 
variable we conduct a GMM instrumental variable estimation. This method is better at 
dealing with heteroscedasticity of unknown form and so may yield greater hypothesis 
testing power given the bimodal distribution of reciprocity. However, it needs to be 
born in mind that the standard errors reported using this method are biased 
downwards (Wooldridge 2002). Column 4 shows that the point estimate for the 
coefficient on reciprocity, while still large, is smaller in the IV GMM estimation than 
in the 2SLS estimation. According to the IV GMM estimation a 1 percent change in 
reciprocity is associated with a 9 percent change in wages. 
                                                 
6 Neither a Hansen-Sargan test nor a Davidson-Mackinon test indicate that the model is over-identified 
and a Hausman test supports the hypothesis that the point estimates in the instrumental and OLS 
models are equal. Tenure may also be endogenous. If we instrument for both reciprocity and tenure, 
both are insignificant and the size of the coefficient on reciprocity does not change significantly.   16
 
To summarize, the relationship between wages and reciprocity is positive, significant, 
and strong. However, we cannot identify a causal link from reciprocity to wages. The 
point estimate on reciprocity in the wage function remains large after controlling for 
endogeneity suggesting that reciprocity may have a considerable effect on wages. 
However, if that is indeed the case, our data is not sufficiently rich to identify the 
relationship. 
  
4.2 Reciprocating norms as predictors of earnings 
 
Now we investigate the impact of reciprocating norms on earnings. First, we 
introduce workplace fixed effects into the model presented in column 1 of Table 3 in 
order to establish whether more reciprocating employees are better remunerated than 
their less reciprocating colleagues. If the individual reciprocity variable shrinks and 
looses significance as a result, it suggests that the tendency to reciprocate is correlated 
with the workplace fixed effects. This would be consistent with the existence of 
distinct reciprocating norms in different workplaces. Then, we replace the workplace 
fixed effects with our proxies for the strength of reciprocating norms,  ) / ln( s r  and 
sd )) / (ln( s r  and with min )) / (ln( s r . Finally, we investigate possible bias due to 
omitted enterprise characteristics. First, we introduce additional enterprise 
characteristics into the model, and second, in order to be explicit about the constraints 
we face in terms of degrees of freedom at the workplace level, we use the estimated 
workplace fixed effects from the individual earnings function as the dependent 
variable in a further set of regressions. The results of these exercises are reported in 
Tables 4, 5 and 6.    17
 
To facilitate easy comparisons, column 1 of Table 4 repeats the OLS results reported 
in column 1 of Table 3. The regression reported in column 2 contains workplace fixed 
effects.
7 Their inclusion reduces the size of the coefficient on individual reciprocity 
and renders it insignificant.
8 The regression reported in column 3 of Table 4 contains 
) / ln( s r  which enters the model with a positive and highly significant coefficient (1 
percent level). The coefficient on sd )) / (ln( s r  in column 4 is negative and highly 
significant. And the coefficient on min )) / (ln( s r  in column 5 is positive and 
significant although lower than the coefficient on the mean. If we include both 
) / ln( s r  and sd )) / (ln( s r  in the model only the former is significant. And if we put all 
three workplace level reciprocity variables in the model, again, only  ) / ln( s r  is 
significant. The three workplace-level reciprocity variables are highly correlated: the 
correlation coefficient between  ) / ln( s r  and sd )) / (ln( s r  is -0.7163, between  ) / ln( s r  
and min )) / (ln( s r  it is 0.7303; and between sd )) / (ln( s r  and min )) / (ln( s r  it is -
0.8686. This explains why we cannot accurately estimate all coefficients when more 
than one enters the model. The introduction of the workplace level reciprocity 
variables reduces the significance but not always the magnitude of the coefficient on 
individual reciprocity. Indeed, when  ) / ln( s r  is included, the coefficient on individual 
reciprocity increases.
9 However, as before, controlling for the possible endogeneity of 
the individual-level reciprocity variable renders it insignificant. 
 
                                                 
7 A random effects model fails the Breusch-Pagan LM test for random effects.  
8 This result remains unchanged if we instrument individual reciprocity. 
9 This result is suggestive of an interaction effect between individual and firm-level reciprocity. 
However, when an interaction is included in the model it is insignificant.   18
The firm level reciprocity variables are unlikely to be endogenous to individual 
earnings, especially as we exclude ego￿s reciprocity from the calculation in every 
case. However, if individual reciprocity is endogenous to earnings and if colleagues￿ 
earnings are highly correlated, the coefficients and standard errors on the firm-level 
reciprocity variables might nevertheless be biased. In other words, the firm-level 
reciprocity variables might be acting as a proxy for other firm-level determinants of 
wages. To explore whether this is the case, in Table 5, we include the mean wage for 
the workforce as an additional regressor. The coefficient and corresponding standard 
error on the mean wage for the workplace will be subject to bias as described by 
Manski (1993). However, we are only interested in seeing whether its inclusion 
reduces the significance of the workplace level reciprocity variables. The coefficient 
on the mean wage is both positive and significant. The coefficients each of our three 
workplace reciprocity variables, while smaller, remain significant. 
 
We only have 20 degrees of freedom at the workplace level and so run the risk of 
over-identifying the model if we incorporate too many workplace-level regressors. 
Over identification can pass undetected when it relates to incorporating group level 
variables in individual level regressions. So, for the remainder of our analysis we use 
the estimated workplace fixed effects relating to the regression in column 2 of Table 4 
as our dependent variable and work with a sample of only 20 workplaces. Initially, 
our set of explanatory variables includes one of the three workplace-level reciprocity 
variables, the total number of employees in the workforce, profits,
10 a dummy 
variable indicating that the enterprise is domestically rather than foreign owned, the 
number of apprentices in the workforce, a dummy indicating that the enterprise is 
                                                 
10 The total number of employees in the workforce and profits have been found to be a key determinant 
of earnings, especially in African manufacturing firms (Bigsten et al, (2000), S￿derbom and Teal 
(2001), Strobl and Thornton (2001), S￿derbom, Teal and Wambugu (2003)).    19
located in Kumasi, the percentage of the workforce that is unionized, and three sector 
dummies. Then we conduct a careful general to specific process of elimination of the 
insignificant (10 percent level used as a cut-off) explanatory variables to ensure that 
overidentification does not lead us to draw spurious conclusions. 
 
Table 5 presents the results of this exercise. Columns 1 to 3 indicate that even after 
including the full set of additional workplace characteristics the coefficients on the 
workplace-level reciprocity variables remain large and significant. Columns 4 to 6 




In this paper we explore the effect of reciprocity between colleagues on individual 
earnings by combining data from a behavioural experiment and surveys relating to the 
same sample of Ghanaian employees and their places of work. We find evidence of a 
strong relationship between individual tendencies to reciprocate and individual 
earnings, even after controlling for a range of other individual characteristics. 
However, our data is not sufficiently rich to enable us to control for potential 
problems of endogeneity and thereby identify the direction of causality. A comparison 
of the kernel density estimations for reciprocity and earnings suggests that, while 
income may have affected reciprocating behaviour in the game, there must be other 
factors such as innate behavioural tendencies or workplace-specific behavioural 
norms also affecting reciprocating behaviour. However, our efforts to identify 
effective instrumental variables were unsuccessful. 
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Our results relating to workplace-specific reciprocating norms are considerably more 
robust. An employee￿s earnings are greater the higher the mean level of reciprocity, 
the lower the standard deviation in reciprocity, and the higher the minimum level of 
reciprocity among his colleagues. These three variables are highly correlated, but all 
relate to the concept of norm strength ￿ a norm of reciprocity is stronger the higher 
the expected return it leads to for trusters, the lower the uncertainty about trustees￿ 
behaviour, and the higher the lowest possible return facing trusters. 
 
Our results lend support to the argument that behavioural characteristics affect labour 
market outcomes, while also indicating that individual employees￿ behavioural 
characteristics generate externalities ￿ their tendency to reciprocate may affect not 
only their own but also their colleagues￿ wages. Further, if wages reflect productivity, 
as argued in theory and shown for the Ghanaian manufacturing sector by Serneels 
(2003), our results suggest that employers should select workers with a strong 
tendency to reciprocate and should facilitate the emergence of strong norms of 
reciprocity among their workers. 
 
Our analysis suffers from several weaknesses. In particular, our efforts to collect data 
that may be used to instrument for individual-level reciprocity and thereby control for 
possible income effects relating to the behavioural variable failed. Also, with only 20 
observations at the level of the workplace, we are deeply constrained when 
endeavouring to control for omitted variable bias.  
 
These weaknesses notwithstanding, our analysis does demonstrate the potential 
advantages to a combined approach to behavioural issues in labour economics. Our   21
experimentally derived data on reciprocity does not suffer from the weaknesses 
associated with attitudinal data. And our fieldwork approach appears to have 
generated interesting results both at the individual and the workplace level. In our 
opinion, this work is most appropriately viewed as a complement to the experimental 
and survey work cited in section 2 above. In particular, the evidence of strong 
associations between experimentally derived measures of reciprocity among 
colleagues and earnings that we present suggests that an experimental approach can 
generate externally valid conclusions. The complementarity between the work of 
Schotter (1998, 2003) and the results presented above is particularly striking.  
   22
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Tables and figures 
 
Figure 1: The Distribution of Reciprocity for workers 


























                   
 
Table 1: Frequency Distribution of the Log of Reciprocity for workers 
Reciprocity ln(reciprocity)  Freq.  Percent  Cum. 
0.33 -1.10  2  1.63  1.63 
0.50 -0.69  4  3.25  4.88 
0.67 -0.41  3  2.44  7.32 
1.00 0.00  31  25.20  32.52 
1.33 0.29  3  2.44  34.96 
1.50 0.41  22  17.89  52.85 
1.67 0.51  2  1.63  54.47 
1.75 0.56  1  0.81  55.28 
2.00 0.69  51  41.46  96.75 
3.00 1.10  4  3.25  100.00 
      
Total   123  100.00   
 
Figure 2: The Distribution of Earnings for workers 
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Table 2: Description of the variables 
Variable name Variable  description Mean Std.  Dev. 
      
Individual characteristics      
Lnearnjob  Log of individual earnings (in Cedi), including allowances, after 
tax 
5.556 0.481 
Ln(r/s)  Log of the amount returned by Player 2 in the Trust Game; proxy 
for individual tendency to reciprocate 
0.354 0.438 
Years with current employer    5.830  5.668 
Years of formal education    10.407  3.096 
Player female  Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual is female  0.186  0.391 
Age in years    32.469  9.998 
Age in years squared    1153.319  782.607 
Blood relative of employer  Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual is related by blood to 
their employer 
0.133 0.341 
Member of a labour union  Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual is a union member  0.310  0.464 
Kumasi  Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual works in Kumasi  0.425  0.497 
Other Christian  Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual belongs to a ￿new￿ 
Christian religion, i.e., Christian but not Protestant or Catholic 
0.345 0.478 
Muslim  Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual is Muslim  0.088  0.285 
No religion   Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual has no religion  0.381  0.488 
Mum￿s education  Years of schooling of mother  3.248  4.543 
Active member of a religion  Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual attends church or 
mosque   
0.956 0.207 
Youngest  Dummy variable equal to one if individual is the youngest in his 
or her family 
0.097 0.298 
Born outside Ghana  Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual is born outside Ghana  0.009  0.094 
Number of siblings    4.973  2.324 
Years spent away from parents    0.593  1.860 
Unhappy as a child  Dummy variable equal to one if  individual reported his or her 
childhood as ￿unhappy￿ or ￿very unhappy￿ on a 5 item Likert 
scale varying from ￿very happy￿ to ￿very unhappy￿. 
0.053 0.225 
Associational membership  Number of clubs, associations, societies or groups the individual 
belongs to. 
0.434 0.581 
Times let down by a friend  Answer to the question ￿During the past 12 months how many 
times has a friend or relative that you trusted let you down?￿ 
0.646 1.511 
      
Firm characteristics      
) / ln( s r   The mean of ln(r/s) for other employees in the same workplace 
(ego excluded from calculation) 
0.348 0.149 
sd(ln(r/s))  The standard deviation of ln(r/s) for other employees in the same 
workplace (ego excluded from calculation) 
0.402 0.125 
min(ln(r/s))  The minimum of ln(r/s) for other employees in the same 
workplace (ego excluded from calculation) 
-0.382 0.501 
Total number of employees  Number of employees in the workforce  47.549  23.588 
Mean lnearn excluding ego  The mean of the logs of individual earnings for other employees 
in the same workplace (ego excluded from calculation) 
5.368 0.453 
Profits per employee  Profits per employee in millions of Cedi  1.631  2.497 
Percentage of workforce unionized    45.841  46.574 
Domestically owned private firm  Dummy variable equal to 1 if employer is a domestically owned 
private firm 
0.646 0.480 
Food   Sector dummy, omitted sectors are wood, metal and machines   0.080  0.272 
Bakery  Sector dummy, omitted sectors are wood, metal and machines  0.035  0.186 
Garment  Sector dummy, omitted sectors are wood, metal and machines  0.088  0.285 
Textile  Sector dummy, omitted sectors are wood, metal and machines  0.186  0.391 
Furniture  Sector dummy, omitted sectors are wood, metal and machines  0.292  0.457 
Chemicals  Sector dummy, omitted sectors are wood, metal and machines  0.133  0.341 
Number of apprentices in the firm    10.133  13.841 






   28
Table 3: Regression of earnings on reciprocity  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 







 lnearnjob  lnearnjob  ln(r/s) lnearnjob 
      
ln(r/s)  0.150  0.150  0.110 
    (0.090)+  (0.208)    (0.137) 
Years with current employer  0.023  0.023  0.005  0.021 
      (0.008)**      (0.008)**  (0.009)      (0.007)** 
Years of formal education  0.022  0.022  0.012  0.011 
 (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
Player  female  -0.144 -0.144 0.029 -0.137 
  (0.112)  (0.106)  (0.115)     (0.073)+ 
Age  in  years  0.032 0.032 -0.007 0.024 
 (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.017) 
Age in years squared  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Blood relative of employer  0.099  0.099  -0.118  -0.068 
 (0.169)  (0.162)  (0.139)  (0.130) 
Member of a labour union  -0.015  -0.015  -0.176  -0.033 
  (0.097)  (0.104)    (0.103)+  (0.091) 
Kumasi  0.101 0.101 -0.178 0.071 
 (0.101)  (0.103)  (0.094)+  (0.084) 
Other  Christian     -0.182  
        (0.105)+   
Constant  4.448 4.448 0.468 4.721 
       (0.369)**       (0.350)**  (0.671)      (0.291)** 
Muslim     0.065  
     (0.176)  
No  religion     -0.049  
     (0.116)  
Mum￿s  education     -0.004  
     (0.014)  
Active member of a religion      -0.220   
     (0.248)  
Youngest     0.339  
           (0.110)**   
Born  outside  Ghana     -0.339  
        (0.154)*   
Number  of  siblings     0.019  
     (0.019)  
Years spent living away from parents      -0.003   
     (0.020)  
Unhappy as child      0.410   
           (0.104)**   
Associational  memberships     0.111  
        (0.065)+   
Times let down by a friend      -0.013   
     (0.040)  
Observations  113 113 113 113 
R-squared 0.24    0.24   
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Introducing workplace fixed effects and workplace reciprocity variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS  Fixed  effects  OLS  OLS  OLS 
  Lnearnjob lnearnjob lnearnjob lnearnjob lnearnjob 
ln(r/s)  0.150 0.092 0.198 0.154 0.155 
  (0.090)+ (0.093) (0.093)*  (0.090)+  (0.089)+ 
years with current employer  0.023  0.019  0.020  0.021  0.019 
  (0.008)** (0.008)* (0.007)**  (0.007)** (0.007)* 
years of formal education  0.022  0.024  0.030  0.024  0.022 
 (0.020)  (0.014)+  (0.016)+  (0.019)  (0.018) 
player  female  -0.144 -0.284 -0.219 -0.203 -0.227 
  (0.112)  (0.121)* (0.112)+ (0.111)+ (0.112)* 
age  in  years  0.032 0.029 0.035 0.038 0.041 
 (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.021)+  (0.021)+  (0.021)+ 
age in years squared  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)+ 
blood relative of employer  0.099  -0.058  0.078  0.091  0.062 
  (0.169) (0.170) (0.154) (0.163) (0.158) 
member of a labour union  -0.015  -0.028  0.048  0.017  0.055 
  (0.097) (0.134) (0.091) (0.090) (0.091) 
Kumasi 0.101    0.247  0.166  0.208 
 (0.101)    (0.098)*  (0.096)+  (0.096)* 
) / ln( s r      1.108    
     (0.334)**     
sd(ln(r/s))       -0.967   
       (0.284)**   
min(ln(r/s))       0.302 
       (0.084)** 
Constant  4.448 4.606 3.851 4.705 4.376 
  (0.369)** (0.429)** (0.391)** (0.385)** (0.366)** 
Observations  113 113 113 113 113 
R-squared  0.24 0.27 0.33 0.29 0.32 
Number  of  workforces    20 20 20 20 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 5: Controlling for mean wage 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 lnearnjob  lnearnjob  lnearnjob 
ln(r/s)  0.171 0.136 0.139 
  [0.088]+ [0.082] [0.083]+ 
years with current employer  0.021  0.021  0.02 
 [0.007]**  [0.007]**  [0.007]** 
years of formal education  0.026  0.021  0.019 
 [0.016]  [0.018]  [0.017] 
player female  -0.253  -0.257  -0.264 
 [0.114]*  [0.115]*  [0.114]* 
age in years  0.033  0.034  0.037 









blood relative of employer  0.081  0.089  0.069 
 [0.151]  [0.150]  [0.150] 
member of a labour union  -0.022  -0.056  -0.021 
 [0.090]  [0.090]  [0.093] 
Kumas 0.208  0.153  0.181 
 [0.100]*  [0.097]  [0.099]+ 
) / ln( s r   0.792    
 [0.330]*     
sd(ln(r/s))   -0.723   
   [0.291]*   
min(ln(r/s))     0.218 
     [0.093]* 
mean lnearn  0.236  0.297  0.259 
 [0.111]*  [0.113]*  [0.120]* 
Constant 2.863  3.184  3.124 
 [0.560]**  [0.600]**  [0.599]** 
Observations 113  113  113 
R-squared 0.36  0.36  0.36 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Workplace-level analysis of earnings controlling for total number of 
employees and mean wage 















   1.692        1.595       
   [0.611]*     [0.330]**      
sd(ln(r/s))   -1.206    -1.204    
    [0.429]*     [0.362]**     
min(ln(r/s))     0.552    0.372 
         [0.164]**        [0.102]** 
total number of employees  -0.001 0.003 0.001       








-8]      
domestic  enterprise  -0.183 0.010 -0.263 -0.173     
  [0.295] [0.290] [0.328]  [0.085]+     
number  of  apprentices  -0.007 -0.013 -0.010       
 [0.006]  [0.006]+  [0.007]       
kumasi  0.367 0.110 0.140 0.380     
 [0.162]+  [0.139]  [0.151]  [0.125]**     
percentage of workforce 
unized -2.98e
-4 -0.002  -0.003       
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]       
food  sector  -0.316 -0.273 -0.175 -0.348 -0.270 -0.292 
  [0.216] [0.237] [0.271]  [0.095]**  [0.086]**  [0.093]** 
garment and textilse sector  0.0189  0.237  0.265       
  [0.134] [0.209] [0.201]       
furnature  0.180 0.304 0.510       
  [0.307] [0.401] [0.409]       
Constant  -0.506 0.412 0.291 -0.563 0.492 0.125 
  [0.293] [0.536] [0.455]  [0.121]**  [0.176]*  [0.081] 
Observations  20 20 20 20 20 20 
R-squared  0.69 0.61 0.69 0.64 0.29 0.35 
Joint sig. of other vars. 
(excluding reciprocity var.)  0.106 0.183 0.158 0.011 0.006 0.006 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
   
 
) / ln( s r